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You Say Yes, But Can I Say No? 
THE FUTURE OF THIRD-PARTY CONSENT 
SEARCHES AFTER GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.1 One way in which courts have applied this provision 
is by asserting that government agents generally cannot search 
a person’s home and seize his belongings without a proper 
search warrant.2 Nevertheless, a warrantless search and 
seizure is considered reasonable when the person whose 
belongings are being searched properly and voluntarily 
consents to the search3 or when that person’s co-occupant 
consents to the search.4 When a co-occupant of the search 
target provides his consent, the warrantless search is valid as 
long as the police reasonably believe that this person shares 
authority over the common area5 of the premises.6 The next 
question becomes: is a search of the common area of a home 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when both co-
occupants are physically present at the time of the search and 
one gives consent while the other contemporaneously refuses to 
consent? For decades, the federal circuit and state courts were 
split over this issue, with most courts answering in the 
  
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 701 (1983). 
 3 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (holding that a 
warrantless search was valid where the subject of a search voluntarily consented to the 
search) (citing United States v. Davis, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946)).  
 4 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that consent to 
a warrantless search by a third party possessing common authority over the premises 
was valid against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority was 
shared).  
 5  A common area might be a living room, for example.  
 6 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (holding that a 
warrantless search was valid where it was based upon consent by a third party whom 
police, at the time of entry, reasonably believed possessed common authority over the 
premises).  
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affirmative.7 In 2006, the United States Supreme Court took 
the opposite position, holding in Georgia v. Randolph that 
when one co-occupant of a common area consents to a 
warrantless search of the area “a physically present co-
occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering 
the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.”8 
The Court’s holding, however, was not strong enough to provide 
lower courts with a uniform answer to this question.9 While 
Randolph commendably sought to protect Fourth Amendment 
constitutional rights, its holding has been interpreted so 
narrowly by lower courts that the rule needs further 
clarification to have any significant effect on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.10 This Note will argue that in the 
context of a search and seizure in which one co-occupant gives 
consent and another is physically present and expressly refuses 
to consent, the Supreme Court needs to define the terms 
“physically present” and “express refusal” more clearly to 
ensure that lower courts apply Randolph consistently when 
analyzing the constitutionality of such searches under the 
Fourth Amendment.  
Part II of this Note will discuss the rule on warrantless 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and the 
consent exception to this rule. Part III will focus on third-party 
consent to warrantless searches, with a discussion of Supreme 
Court precedent on the issue prior to Georgia v. Randolph. 
Next, Part IV will compare the approaches the federal circuit 
courts and the state courts have taken when one co-occupant 
refuses consent in the presence of a third party who grants 
consent. These approaches created the split of authority that 
Georgia v. Randolph sought to resolve. Part V will thoroughly 
discuss the recent Supreme Court decision of Georgia v. 
Randolph. Part VI will address the issue of a co-occupant’s 
refusal in the presence of third-party consent to warrantless 
searches since Randolph. This Part will also discuss the effects 
of Randolph on lower courts and argue that the law should be 
changed to reflect concerns about a defendant’s rights, the risk 
  
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United 
States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 1977); Love v. State, 355 Ark. 334, 341-42 
(2003); Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-04 (Wyo. 1991).  
 8 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).  
 9 See infra Part VI.A. 
 10 See infra Part VI. 
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to domestic abuse victims, and the preservation of peace in the 
home.  
II. RULE ON WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND THE  
CONSENT EXCEPTION  
A. Unreasonableness of Warrantless Searches Under  
the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause. . . .”11 The “central requirement” of the Fourth 
Amendment is one of reasonableness.12 Searches and seizures 
of personal property are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment “‘unless . . . accomplished pursuant to a judicial 
warrant’ issued by a neutral magistrate after finding probable 
cause.”13 The warrant requirement is based on the Fourth 
Amendment’s essential purpose of protecting citizens from 
intrusions of privacy by the government.14 Thus, the entry into 
a person’s home by the government without a warrant is a 
physical intrusion that is “unreasonable per se,”15 “whether to 
  
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 12 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 739 (1983)). 
 13 Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)). This Note will 
focus particularly on the reasonableness of conducting warrantless searches. For the 
purposes of this Note, seizures of property only become an issue where the government 
wants to use such property as evidence against the defendant as a result of such 
searches.  
 14 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958). The Fourth Amendment’s 
protection of a person’s privacy is based on a subjective expectation of privacy exhibited 
by the person, and an objective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (stating 
that “[t]he right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those 
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; 
and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the 
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they 
violate the privacy of the home.”).  
 15 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (citing Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)). 
The per se rule is derived from combining the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment’s first clause with the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment’s second clause. See Sharon E. Abrams, Comment, Third-Party Consent 
Searches, the Supreme Court, and the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 963, 963 n.3 (1984). 
424 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”16 Ultimately, 
under our current constitutional understanding, when a 
defendant challenges the validity of a warrantless search, a 
court’s analysis begins with the presumption of 
unreasonableness.17  
B. Consent Exception 
Despite the per se rule that warrantless searches are 
unreasonable, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of 
exceptions. These exceptions occur mostly under exigent 
circumstances, such as danger to the public and hot pursuit of 
a suspect18 or during a search incident to arrest.19 Warrantless 
searches also may be considered reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment where courts find diminished expectations of 
privacy.20 Some view the exceptions, however, in a much more 
narrow light. As Justice Douglas wrote, “[O]nly the gravest of 
circumstances could excuse the failure to secure a properly 
issued search warrant.”21  
  
 16 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (citing Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)).  
 17 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (holding that a government agent’s electronic 
surveillance of the defendant’s conversation in a telephone booth was unconstitutional 
without a proper search warrant); see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; Jones, 357 U.S. at 497-
99; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).  
 18 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not require police officers to delay an investigation where to do so 
could gravely endanger human life).  
 19 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); Jones, 357 U.S. at 499 
(stating that “[t]he exceptions to a rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant 
have been jealously and carefully drawn, and search incident to a valid arrest is among 
them.”). Other exceptions include “investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, 
seizure of items in plain view, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches, 
border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the 
special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements 
impracticable.” Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 91 GEO. L.J. 36, 
36 (2003).  
 20 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). Some examples of 
circumstances or places in which diminished expectations exist are “searches of 
automobiles, drunk-driving checkpoints, temporary seizure of luggage, and a 
temporary stop and limited search for weapons.” Frank J. Eichenlaub, Carnivore: 
Taking a Bite out of the Fourth Amendment?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 315, 332 n.121 (2001).  
 21 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 183 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (“Absent 
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between 
the citizen and the police. . . . We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and 
excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek 
exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made 
that course imperative.”).  
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One Fourth Amendment-based exception to the rule on 
warrantless searches that has been the source of much 
controversy is the consent exception.22 As set forth in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the search of property, without a 
warrant and without probable cause, but with proper and 
voluntary consent, is valid under the Fourth Amendment.23 
Proper consent must be obtained from an individual possessing 
authority over the property being searched.24 To determine 
whether consent is voluntary, courts use a totality of the 
circumstances test, considering factors such as 
(1) knowledge of the constitutional right to refuse consent; (2) age, 
intelligence, education, and language ability; (3) the degree to which 
the individual cooperates with the police; (4) the individual’s attitude 
about the likelihood of the discovery of contraband; and (5) the 
length of detention and the nature of questioning, including the use 
of physical punishment or other coercive police behavior.25 
 To determine whether a search is reasonable based on 
consent, courts use an objective standard.26 A police officer is 
required to “ask him or herself what the typical, reasonable 
person would have understood by the exchange between  
the officer and the suspect” and to conclude whether or not  
the suspect gave his consent.27 Arguably, the voluntariness of 
the defendant’s consent does not have as much weight today as 
it did when the Court created the consent doctrine in 
Schneckloth. While a defendant’s consent must still be 
voluntary, the Supreme Court’s paradigm for the consent 
search doctrine has become less focused on the subjective test 
of the defendant’s voluntariness and more concerned with the 
  
 22 See Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the 
Overlooked Function of the Consent Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2187-88 (2006) 
(arguing that while the Supreme Court has favored consent searches, commentators 
have denounced their use and several states have banned their use because of 
“controversies about racial profiling”) (citation omitted).  
 23 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
 24 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).  
 25 Douglas K. Yatter et al., Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 88 GEO. L.J. 912, 946-49 (2000) 
(citations omitted).  
 26 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) 
(“[D]etermination of consent to enter must ‘be judged against an objective standard.’”). 
 27 Nancy J. Kloster, Note, An Analysis of the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth 
Amendment Regarding Voluntary Third Party Consent Searches: The Defendant’s 
Perspective, 72 N.D. L. REV. 99, 103 (1996) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 
(1991)).  
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objective test of whether the officer compelled the defendant’s 
consent.28  
The consent exception initially derived from the theory 
that a defendant could waive his Fourth Amendment rights,29 
either directly or though an agent.30 Over time, however, the 
consent doctrine has broadened beyond the bounds of waiver 
and agency principles.31 It has been held that a defendant’s 
waiver of a constitutional right must be made knowingly and 
intelligently.32 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, however, the 
Court held that providing consent could be voluntary without 
the defendant knowing that he had the right to refuse to do 
so.33 The reason for this comes from balancing the need to 
protect an individual’s constitutional rights while also allowing 
for effective law enforcement.34 In this situation, law 
enforcement purposes win out over constitutional protections 
because the consent to search is not a trial or pre-trial right on 
which the defendant’s “knowledge and intelligence” can easily 
be judged.35 Because it was not required that defendants be 
aware of their Fourth Amendment right, some justices and 
commentators saw this as an erosion of constitutional 
protections.36 Despite such criticism, the Supreme Court 
generally favors the consent exception.37  
  
 28 Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 776 (2001); see also 
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002) (noting that where an exchange 
takes place between police officer and citizen in which a police officer asks a citizen for 
his consent, “it dispels inferences of coercion.”).  
 29 Kloster, supra note 27, at 104-05 (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 
489 (1964)). 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 105-06.  
 32 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (citing Colorado v. Spring, 
479 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1987)); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).  
 33 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (“There is a vast 
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind 
requiring a ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ waiver of trial rights, or in the practical 
application of such a requirement[,] suggests that it ought to be extended to the 
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see also 
Kloster, supra note 27, at 107.  
 34 INGA L. PARSONS, FOURTH AMENDMENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 101 
(National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 2005). 
 35 Id.  
 36 Kloster, supra note 27, at 107 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). For a discussion on the criticism of consent searches, see 
generally Note, supra note 22.  
 37 Note, supra note 22; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1, at 5 (4th ed. 2004); United States v. 
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Thus, the “strict requirement” of a warrant to conduct a 
search under the Fourth Amendment is not as strict as it 
seems. The Supreme Court has judicially created a number of 
exceptions to the per se rule, mostly for safety and law 
enforcement purposes, but also to allow an individual 
possessing authority to permit the search if he voluntarily 
consents. Accordingly, because any individual possessing 
common authority can give consent,38 the target of the search 
does not always need to consent in order for a consent search to 
be reasonable and valid against him.  
III. THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES 
Under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that consent may properly 
be obtained from a third party if it is not obtained from the 
subject of the search.39 For the purposes of this Note, the person 
who is the target or subject of the search will be referred to as 
the primary party.40 This is the person for whom the evidence is 
being sought and whose constitutional rights are at stake. A 
third party is an individual who possesses common authority to 
consent to a search but who does not become a defendant 
challenging the admission of evidence that is the fruit of the 
search.41 
Less stringent constitutional protections are afforded to 
primary parties in the context of consenting to a warrantless 
  
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (“In a society based on law, the concept of agreement 
and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full 
accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for 
the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance 
on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of 
coercion.”). 
 38  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). 
 39 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974). The Supreme Court 
had implicitly validated third-party consent searches in previous cases. See, e.g., 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Chapman v. United States. 365 U.S. 
610 (1961); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914).  
 40 The term “primary party” has not been used by courts. Elizabeth Wright 
adopted the phrase for the convenience of discussing third-party consent searches. See 
Elizabeth A. Wright, Note, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: 
Refusal, Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1841, 1843 n.13 (2005).  
 41 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 (stating that the justification of a warrantless 
search is not limited to proof of voluntary consent given by the defendant, but also 
extends to permission to search obtained from a third party). Of course, evidence as a 
result of the search can be used against the third party. See Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 
315, 318-21 (Del. 2006).  
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search than in other aspects of a criminal prosecution, such as 
the waiving of trial rights.42 Defendants cannot effectively 
waive their trial rights unless the waiver is “knowing and 
intelligent,” whereas the validity of a consent to a warrantless 
search requires only voluntariness, evaluated on a variety of 
factors.43 Given that the target of a search lacks the heightened 
constitutional protection of a defendant waiving a trial right, it 
is perhaps not surprising that a third party can effectively 
consent to a search against the defendant without the 
defendant’s participation.  
A. Matlock Rule: Common Authority and Assumption  
of Risk  
United States v. Matlock has been at the core of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the third-party consent 
exception for roughly the last three decades.44 The Matlock 
Court developed the rule that “consent of one who possesses 
common authority over premises or effects is valid as against 
the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is 
shared.”45 In Matlock, the police arrested the defendant 
Matlock in the front yard of the house where he and Mrs. Gayle 
Graff lived.46 When the police officers went to the door, where 
Mrs. Graff stood, they asked her if they could search the 
house.47 The officers entered and searched the house based on 
Mrs. Graff’s consent without asking the defendant for his 
consent, despite knowing that Matlock lived there as well.48 
After Mrs. Graff told the officers that she shared the east 
bedroom with the defendant, the police entered that bedroom 
and found evidence to be used against the defendant.49 The 
Court held that Mrs. Graff’s voluntary consent validated the 
warrantless search against Matlock because she had common 
authority over the bedroom.50  
  
 42 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245-46; see also, Abrams, supra note 15, at 967. 
 43 See supra Part II.B; see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (citing 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1987); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938)).  
 44  Abrams, supra note 15, at 969.  
 45 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.  
 46 Id. at 166.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. at 166-67.  
 50 Id. at 164, 177.  
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In order for a third party to have the authority to 
properly give consent, he must share common authority over 
the area or have some other sufficient relationship with the 
primary party over the premises being searched.51 The two 
main rationales behind the Matlock “common authority” rule 
are: (1) the third party has mutual use of the property being 
searched because he has joint access or control with the 
primary party52 and (2) the primary party has assumed the risk 
that a person with whom he shares an area will allow visitors 
into that area.53 Several commentators have referred to the 
Matlock rule as the “possession and control” or “access and 
control” test.54  
Even before Matlock, many lower federal and state 
courts had used “common authority” principles to judge the 
validity of third-party consent searches; the Matlock decision 
was the Supreme Court’s ratification of this approach.55 Despite 
this ratification, Matlock did not clearly articulate the 
parameters and constitutional justifications for its third-party 
consent exception.56 Although the Matlock Court included an 
express reference to the “absent nonconsenting person,”57 its 
“common authority” analysis did not mention Matlock’s 
  
 51 See id. at 171. For an example of the factors courts have used to determine 
whether a third party had common authority, see United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 
311, 319 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 52 This principle is not based on rules of property. Rather than giving the 
authority to consent to the person who owns the property being searched, this principle 
gives only the persons who use the property the right to decide if they want to permit 
visitors to enter and search the area. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. It has been held 
that if a third party, even the property owner, does not share mutual use of the 
property with the defendant, this does not create the common understanding of 
authority to permit guests to enter without the consent of the occupant of the premises. 
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006). For the proposition that a landlord 
cannot by right give valid consent for a search of a tenant’s area, see Chapman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961). For the proposition that a hotel manager 
cannot give valid consent to search a guest’s room, see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 
483, 489 (1964).  
 53 The “assumption of risk” theory, derived from tort law, espouses that 
“when two or more co-occupants share a space in common, each one accepts the 
possibility that another may permit a search.” Wright, supra note 40, at 1857-58; see 
LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 8.3(a), at 148-49; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) 
(holding that the consent to search a duffel bag given by petitioner’s cousin was valid 
because petitioner allowed his cousin to use the bag and therefore assumed the risk 
that his cousin might allow someone else to look inside).  
 54 E.g., Abrams, supra note 15, at 967-68. 
 55 Id. at 967-69.  
 56 Id. at 966 (quoting John B. Wefing & John G. Miles, Jr., Consent Searches 
and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 211, 261 (1974)).  
 57  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.  
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particular facts. Thus, the rule does not necessarily require 
that the primary party be absent for the third-party consent 
search to be valid.58 In addition, because the defendant in 
Matlock was arrested in the front yard and detained in a squad 
car near the house when the police obtained consent,59 lower 
courts disagree as to whether Matlock’s absence was truly a 
deciding factor in the Court’s holding.60  
Despite the problems courts face in interpreting the 
scope of the ruling, Matlock clearly allows warrantless searches 
of a common area to be constitutional if a third party having 
common authority consented to the search. 
B. The Illinois v. Rodriguez Rule: Apparent Authority  
About fifteen years after Matlock, the Supreme Court 
held that a third party did not necessarily need to have 
common authority over the premises in order for a third-party 
consent search to be valid. Generally, under the Fourth 
Amendment, police officers do not need to be factually correct 
in their assessment of what evidence a search will produce in 
order for a search to be reasonable.61 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
this principle was extended so that police officers do not need to 
be factually correct about who has common authority to 
consent to a search.62  
Rodriguez held that if the police reasonably believe, 
even if erroneously, that a person who consents to a 
warrantless police entry is a resident of (or has common 
authority over) the premises, the search is valid and its fruits 
may be used as evidence against the defendant.63 In Rodriguez, 
Gail Fischer told the police that Edward Rodriguez assaulted 
  
 58 See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 968; see also Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-72; Wright, 
supra note 40, at 1872 (explaining that “[i]f common authority is the basis for third 
party consent searches, then the primary party’s location is irrelevant”).  
 59 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109-10 (2006). 
 60 Abrams, supra note 15, at 970; see also id. at 977 (arguing that “[a] theory 
that would allow a defendant’s presence during and objection to a third-party consent 
search to invalidate that search . . . finds no theoretical support in the Matlock 
decision”); Wright, supra note 40, at 1871 (explaining that “[c]ourts that allowed third 
party consent to trump the primary party’s refusal concentrated on the fact that the 
defendant [in Matlock] was actually present in his front yard, though the police failed 
to ask his permission to search, and, instead, received permission from a co-occupant of 
the house”) (citing United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977)). 
 61 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990). 
 62 Id. at 184. 
 63 Id. at 186-89.  
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her.64 Fischer consented to take the police to an apartment 
where she said Rodriguez was asleep so they could arrest him.65 
Fischer referred to the apartment as “our apartment” and told 
the police that she had clothes and furniture there.66 The  
police entered the apartment without obtaining an arrest 
warrant or a search warrant; upon entering, they found 
contraband in plain view and proceeded to arrest Rodriguez, 
who was sleeping in the bedroom.67 The Court remanded for a 
determination of whether the police officers reasonably 
believed that Fischer had the authority to consent to a search 
of the apartment.68 If the lower court found that the police 
reasonably believed she had common authority, then the 
search would be valid.69 The issue in Rodriguez was not 
whether the defendant waived his Fourth Amendment right, 
but whether the police violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches.70 Therefore, the focus of reasonableness 
is no longer on the defendant’s actions or inactions to 
determine whether he subjectively consented, but rather on the 
police officer’s objective factual determination of whether a 
reasonable officer would believe properly authorized consent 
has been given.71  
In effect, the Rodriguez Court adopted the doctrine of 
apparent authority to apply to third-party consent searches.72 
Under agency law, apparent authority allows an agent to bind 
his principal where it appears that the agent has authority to 
act for the principal, even if the agent does not actually have 
authority.73 Accordingly, if a third party does not actually have 
common authority to give consent to the police, then an absent 
  
 64 Id. at 179.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 180.  
 68 Id. at 189.  
 69 Id. at 188-89.  
 70 Id. at 187. 
 71 Id. at 188 (“Determination of consent to enter must ‘be judged against an 
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the consenting party had authority of the 
premises?”) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)); see also Kloster, supra 
note 27, at 103.  
 72 The Court had previously rejected the applicability of this doctrine in 
Stoner v. California. 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964) (stating that Fourth Amendment rights 
“are not to be eroded by unrealistic doctrines of ‘apparent authority’ ”).  
 73 See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Doctrine of Apparent Authority as Applicable 
Where Relationship Is that of Master and Servant, 2 A.L.R. 2D 406, § 1 (1948) (citations 
omitted). 
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primary party is still vulnerable to a warrantless search. As a 
result of Rodriguez, a third-party consent search can be valid 
without a primary party necessarily assuming the risk that 
this person might permit someone to enter and search.74 Thus, 
the apparent authority rule of Rodriguez undercuts the key 
principle of “assumption of risk” in the Matlock rule.75 Justice 
Marshall noted this problem in his dissent, arguing that the 
constitutionality of the Matlock “assumption of risk” rule rested 
on the idea that a person had voluntarily given up his 
expectation of privacy when he shared access or control of a 
common area with a co-occupant.76 If police officers are 
mistaken about a third party’s authority to consent, the search 
loses its “constitutional footing” because the defendant may not 
have shared access or control with that person, and thus the 
defendant would not have a diminished expectation of 
privacy.77 After Rodriguez, one commentator argued that the 
apparent authority test does not properly shield citizens from 
privacy intrusions by the government as required by the 
Fourth Amendment.78 Another commentator, not expecting the 
“apparent authority test” to be adopted, hypothesized several 
years before Rodriguez that “[i]f searches are validated merely 
because police think that they are reasonable, very few 
searches will be found constitutionally invalid.”79 Thus, there is 
a strong argument that the Rodriguez rule is a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was clearly moving in 
the direction of expanding the third-party consent exception. 
The lower federal courts and the state courts accordingly 
expanded this exception as well.  
  
 74 Wright, supra note 40, at 1858. For example, if the police reasonably 
believe that a landlord has common authority over a tenant’s apartment, his consent 
will validate a warrantless search of the apartment despite the fact that the tenant did 
not give the landlord the authority to permit the police to enter. See supra note 52; see 
also Gregory S. Fisher, Search and Seizure, Third-Party Consent: Rethinking Police 
Conduct and the Fourth Amendment, 66 WASH. L. REV. 189, 200 (1991) (“Rodriguez 
effectively destroys the common authority test.”).  
 75 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
 76 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 194 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 77 Id.  
 78 Fisher, supra note 74, at 198-99; see also Kloster, supra note 27, at 112-13 
(arguing that by validating warrantless searches where a consenting party does not 
have at least some actual control over the premises, “the Court took a final bite from 
the already devoured Fourth Amendment”). 
 79 Abrams, supra note 15, at 977-78 (arguing that a theory in which the 
reasonableness of a search depends on the police officers’ perceptions at the time of the 
search has major flaws).  
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IV.  THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES AND PRESENT 
PRIMARY PARTY REFUSAL BEFORE RANDOLPH  
Arguably, the Matlock and Rodriguez holdings only 
resolved the issue of third-party consent when the primary 
party is absent. The Supreme Court had not expressly 
addressed the question of whether a warrantless search is valid 
when the police allow a third party’s consent to override a 
nonconsenting primary party who is present at the time of the 
search. Matlock left courts with two possible interpretations. 
First, Matlock could be interpreted to imply that a search is 
valid whenever a third party with common authority consents 
to a search, even if his co-occupant is present and objects.80 
Second, under a more literal interpretation of the Court’s 
ruling, Matlock could be read to limit the validity of third-party 
consent only to searches against the “absent, nonconsenting 
person.”81 The latter interpretation requires the consent of both 
present co-occupants under the rationale that both have equal 
rights over the home and one co-occupant’s consent should not 
have more weight than the other’s refusal.82 This interpretation 
is more consistent with the objective of the Fourth Amendment: 
to protect against an intrusion by the government on one’s 
expectation of privacy.83 While it is reasonable to believe that a 
co-occupant assumes the risk of such an intrusion when he is 
absent and leaves his property in the hands of his co-occupant, 
it is not reasonable to do so when he is present and objects to 
the intrusion.84 To undermine one’s refusal because of another’s 
consent is to undermine his or her personal autonomy.  
Nevertheless, despite “the latter [interpretation’s] 
somewhat greater appeal,”85 most federal and state courts had 
adopted the former view.86 The clear majority held that Matlock 
allows third-party consent to trump primary party refusal 
regardless of whether the primary party was present or absent 
  
 80 This is because of the fact that the defendant in Matlock was present in the 
front yard just before the search and in the squad car near the house at the time of the 
search. See id. at 975; United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 179 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  
 81  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170. 
 82 Id. at 170 (emphasis omitted); LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 159, § 8.3(d) 
(citations omitted).  
 83  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 84 See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.  
 85 LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 159, § 8.3(d).  
 86 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 108 n.1 (2006).  
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at the time of the search.87 All the federal circuit courts that 
had addressed this question had taken this position.88 Nearly 
all the state courts had reached the same conclusion as well.89 
A minority view, however, had interpreted Matlock narrowly 
by invalidating third-party consent when the primary party is 
present and nonconsenting.90 The few state courts that had 
adhered to this view gave more weight to the present primary 
party’s refusal than to the third party’s consent.91 Thus, some 
disagreement had existed among the courts over the 
reasonableness of third-party consent in the situation of a 
“disagreeing co-occupant.”92  
A. Majority View  
All the federal circuit courts that had addressed this 
question had held that third-party consent trumps primary 
party refusal.93 In the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. 
Morning,94 for example, the defendant answered the door to 
federal agents and objected to a search before the defendant’s 
co-occupant came to the door and provided the agents with 
consent.95 The court determined that the federal agents’ search 
of the defendant’s house was valid against the defendant 
despite his presence and objection to the search because his co-
occupant had consented.96 The court struggled with applying 
Matlock because the defendant in Matlock was on the scene 
when the police asked the third party for consent, and the 
Court was unclear about the significance of the primary party’s 
location in this situation.97 Prior Ninth Circuit cases had 
interpreted Matlock to imply that it did not matter if the 
  
 87 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108 n.1.   
 88 Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Dissent Reveals Strain Beneath 
Court’s Placid Surface, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at A1. 
 89 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108 n.1; Greenhouse, supra note 88.  
 90 See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835 (2004); State v. Leach, 782 
P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989); Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977). 
 91 Cf. Abrams, supra note 15, at 975 (arguing that, despite the author’s 
disagreement with the principle, the Matlock test seems to mandate the result that 
one’s objection to a police search of one’s own home can be overridden by the consent of 
another occupant of that home).  
 92 Id. at 969.  
 93 See infra notes 94-107. 
 94 64 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 95 Id. at 532.  
 96 Id. at 537.  
 97 Id. at 534 (“[W]hile Matlock rendered the law in this area translucent, it 
did not render it transparent”).  
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defendant was present or absent, but only whether the third 
party had common authority over or other sufficient 
relationship to the premises.98 Ultimately, the Morning court 
applied the Matlock rule to find that the defendant assumed 
the risk by sharing the house with another occupant, and 
therefore his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
because there was a reasonable expectation that the co-
occupant could allow someone to enter.99  
To reach its conclusion, the Morning court looked to how 
other federal circuits had addressed the issue.100 The Sixth 
Circuit, in United States v. Sumlin, had held that a defendant’s 
presence and refusal to consent did not matter, noting that in 
Matlock the defendant was in the front yard at the time of the 
search.101 As in Matlock, the defendant in Sumlin was first 
arrested, but unlike Matlock, Sumlin was asked for his consent 
before the police obtained consent from his female 
companion.102 The Sumlin court determined that the 
defendant’s refusal to consent did not overcome the assumed 
risk that a co-occupant would expose common private areas to 
a search; thus, he did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.103 Similarly, in United States v. Donlin, the First 
Circuit held that “[v]alid consent may be given by a defendant 
or a third party with ‘common authority’ over the premises” 
and that “[t]hird party consent remains valid even when the 
defendant specifically objects to it.”104 The D.C. Circuit held in 
United States v. Hendrix that consent obtained from a third-
party joint occupant was valid when another occupant had 
been present and objected to search.105 The Eleventh Circuit 
held in Lenz v. Wilburn that the consent of a third party with 
common authority is valid, “even when a present subject of the 
search objects.”106 The Fifth Circuit held in United States v. 
Baldwin that third-party consent trumps primary party refusal 
  
 98 E.g., id. at 536; United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1975).  
 99 United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 100 Id. at 534. 
 101 United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 688.  
 104 United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 105 United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).  
 106 Lenz v. Wilburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995).  
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in an automobile search.107 In sum, no federal circuit court 
before Randolph had held that a search is unreasonable where 
the police rely on the consent of a third party in the face of an 
objection to the search by a physically present co-occupant.  
Most state courts had agreed with the federal circuit 
courts. These courts admitted evidence against a defendant 
who was present and who objected at the time of a warrantless 
search if a co-occupant gave consent.108 In the Arkansas case of 
Love v. State, for example, the defendant refused consent, but 
his co-occupant consented, and as a result of the permitted 
entry, the police officers saw contraband in the defendant’s 
bedroom from the living room.109 The court admitted the 
contraband into evidence over the defendant’s objection.110 On 
both the state and federal circuit court levels, the majority view 
had been that third-party consent trumps present primary 
party refusal.  
B. Minority View  
However, not all state courts agreed. A minority of state 
courts has held that a present primary party’s refusal can 
trump a third party’s consent. The leading post-Matlock case 
that adheres to this view is Florida’s Silva v. State.111 There, 
Mrs. Brandon, who lived with the defendant, called the police 
from outside the home after the defendant had hit her.112 When 
the police arrived, she let them in and informed them about the 
defendant’s guns kept in a hall closet.113 Mrs. Brandon 
consented to a search of the closet, and, despite the present 
defendant’s objections, the police searched the closet and found 
the guns.114 The Silva court held that the search was 
unconstitutional on the theory that it is reasonable for a person 
whose property is being searched to have “controlling authority 
to refuse consent” and that “a present, objecting party should 
  
 107 United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United 
States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1988).  
 108 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 108 n.1 (2006).  
 109 Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 680-81 (Ark. 2003).  
 110 Id. at 681; see also Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-04 (Wyo. 1991).  
 111 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977); see also Lawton v. State, 320 So. 2d 463, 464 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he search cannot stand because appellant was physically 
present on the premises and affirmatively objected to the search.”).  
 112 Silva, 344 So. 2d at 560.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Id.  
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not have his constitutional rights ignored because of a 
leasehold or other property interest shared with another.”115  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington had held 
in State v. Leach that the police must obtain the consent of a 
cohabitant who is present and able to object.116 In Leach, the 
evidence was not even clear that the defendant objected to the 
search.117 The Washington court, however, interpreted Matlock 
only to refer to “absent, nonconsenting persons,” and sought to 
decide whether the rule was applicable to present primary 
parties.118 The court examined both positions and ultimately 
held that an individual does not assume the risk that a 
cohabitant will permit someone’s entrance over his objection 
when he is present. The assumption of risk principle is only 
reasonable, and thus applicable, when the individual is 
absent.119 The court’s majority reasoned that to rule otherwise 
would be placing “expediency over an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment guarantees,” and the court “refuse[d] to beat a 
path to the door of exceptions.”120  
While a small minority of state courts had invalidated 
third-party consent searches in cases of present primary party 
refusal, the majority of courts in this country had refused to 
apply the Fourth Amendment in these situations. Instead, 
most courts had interpreted Matlock to mean that third-party 
consent takes precedence over a primary party’s refusal, 
whether or not the primary party is physically present at the 
time of the search. Although the minority view was not widely 
held, a lack of unanimity had developed over the issue prior to 
the Supreme Court’s consideration of Georgia v. Randolph.  
  
 115 Id. at 562. However, under facts quite similar to Silva, the New York Court 
of Appeals held to the contrary, finding that “where an individual shares with others 
common authority over premises or property, he has no right to prevent a search in the 
face of the knowing and voluntary consent of a co-occupant with equal authority.” 
People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (1979).  
 116 State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Wash. 1989).  
 117 Id. at 1038. When a detective came to search the defendant’s office with 
the defendant’s girlfriend, the defendant was present and was then placed under arrest 
and seated in an office chair. Id. at 1036.  
 118 Id. at 1038. 
 119 Id. at 1039.  
 120 Id. at 1040; see also People v. Mortimer, 361 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (App. Div. 
1974) (“[I]f the Fourth Amendment means anything, it means that the police may not 
undertake a warrantless search of defendant’s property after he has expressly denied 
his consent to such a search. Constitutional rights may not be defeated by the 
expedient of soliciting several persons successively until the sought-after consent is 
obtained.”). Georgia was also one of the states that adhered to the minority view. See 
infra Part V.B.  
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V.  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES  
THE ISSUE IN GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH 
When a Georgia Supreme Court case dealing with this 
issue reached the United States Supreme Court in 2005, the 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in authority.121 
Despite the existence of a clear majority view, the Supreme 
Court resolved the issue in favor of the minority view.122 
Although the Court had expanded the consent exception in 
recent years,123 in 2006 it took a step back by restricting the 
validity of third-party consent searches in Georgia v. 
Randolph.124 As a result, warrantless searches are 
unreasonable and invalid against a primary party who is 
present and expressly refuses consent, even if a third party 
having common authority gives his consent.125  
A.  The Facts of Randolph  
Scott Randolph and his wife Janet were separated in 
May 2001, when Janet left their marital residence in Georgia 
with their son to stay with her parents in Canada.126 Two 
months later, Janet returned with their child to their home in 
Georgia.127 One morning, not long after having returned, Janet 
called the police complaining that after a domestic dispute with 
her husband, Scott took away their son.128 When the police 
arrived at the house, Janet accused Scott of using cocaine.129 
When Scott arrived at the house, he denied being a cocaine 
user and accused his wife of having drug and alcohol 
problems.130 Janet then volunteered information to the police 
that there were drugs in the house.131 When one of the officers 
asked Scott for permission to search the house, “he 
unequivocally refused,” but when the officer subsequently 
  
 121 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 108 (2006).  
 122 Id. 
 123 See supra Part III.  
 124 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108.  
 125 Id. at 120. 
 126 Id. at 106. 
 127 Id.  
 128 Id. at 107.  
 129 Id.  
 130 Id.  
 131 Id.  
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asked Janet for consent, she provided it.132 The officer entered, 
and Janet showed him to a “bedroom that she identified as 
Scott’s.”133 In the bedroom, the officer found a drinking straw on 
which he suspected there was cocaine.134 The officer then left 
the house to apply for a warrant, but when he returned Janet 
withdrew her consent.135 The police then obtained a search 
warrant and conducted a search from which they found 
evidence leading to Scott Randolph’s indictment for possession 
of cocaine.136  
B.  The Georgia Courts’ Decisions  
The defendant argued that the warrantless search was 
unauthorized because, despite his wife’s consent, he expressly 
refused the search.137 The trial court denied his motion to 
suppress evidence on the grounds that the search was valid 
based on his wife’s common authority to consent.138 The Georgia 
Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court 
affirmed,139 thereby applying the minority view on the issue. 
Georgia’s highest court found Matlock distinguishable because 
Randolph was not absent in this case as the defendant was in 
Matlock.140  
C.  The Supreme Court’s Decision  
With a 5-3 majority141 opinion written by Justice Souter, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
decision in favor of the defendant.142 The majority noted that 
widely shared social expectations have traditionally had a 
great significance when assessing the reasonableness of Fourth 
  
 132 Id.  
 133 Id.  
 134 Id.  
 135 Id.  
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 107-08.  
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at 108. The Georgia Supreme Court stated, “[T]he consent to conduct a 
warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not valid in the face of the 
refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to permit a 
warrantless search.” State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004). 
 140 State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d at 837.  
 141 Justice Alito did not participate in the opinion because he was newly 
appointed and did not join the bench until after the Court had heard oral arguments on 
the case. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 123; Greenhouse, supra note 88.  
 142 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122-23.  
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Amendment consent search cases.143 Under the Matlock rule, 
these social expectations, which are influenced by property 
laws but not controlled by them, allow co-occupants to have 
certain authority over their shared property that may affect 
each other’s interests.144 The Court agreed with Matlock that it 
would be extraordinary for visitors to make sure that all 
cohabitants of a household do not object to their entry before 
accepting an invitation to come in the house.145 Nevertheless, 
the majority stated that the issue of the reasonableness of a 
search where the police rely on the consent of one co-occupant 
in the face of an objection by another had not yet been 
addressed.146 According to the majority, because co-occupants 
generally do not have superior rights over other co-occupants, 
Matlock’s common authority principle does not apply to 
situations where a co-occupant’s consent would override the 
express objection of another co-occupant.147 The Court noted 
that it had previously used customary social expectations to 
assert that “overnight houseguests have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters.”148 
Accordingly, it follows that a resident of the home should have 
this expectation as well.149 Therefore, a primary party’s 
objection to a search should be respected because he has an 
expectation of privacy as one of the co-occupants of the home 
being searched.150  
The Court applied the long-held principle of respecting 
the privacy of one’s home151 as well as the old adage that a 
man’s home is his castle152 to support its reasoning.153 The Court 
  
 143 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. at 111-12.  
 146 Id. at 109.  
 147 Id. at 114 (“[T]here is no common understanding that one co-tenant 
generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, 
whether the issue is color of curtains or invitations to outsiders.”). 
 148 Id. at 113 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).  
 149 Id.  
 150 See id.  
 151 Id. at 115 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999)). 
 152 Id. (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)). 
 153 Id. (asserting that “[d]isputed permission is thus no match for this central 
value of the Fourth Amendment, and the State’s other countervailing claims do not add 
up to outweigh it”). The majority reasoned that an alternative to allowing a third-party 
consent search would be for the co-occupant to deliver evidence or information to the 
police. Id. at 115-16 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403. U.S. 443, 487-89 (1971)). 
The police could also rely on information given by a co-occupant to obtain a warrant, 
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recognized that certain situations create exigencies that may 
justify immediate action by the police,154 but emphasized that 
there needs to be a clear justification for government searches 
over a resident’s objection.155  
On the other hand, the majority was not completely 
deferential to the defendant.156 The Court was careful not to 
overrule the holdings of Matlock or Rodriguez, making it 
particularly clear that Matlock’s rule that a third-party consent 
search is reasonable over an absent, nonconsenting co-habitant 
still stands firmly.157 Therefore, if a primary party is not 
present and does not make an express objection to the search, 
the third party’s consent is valid. Moreover, the police do not 
need to take affirmative steps to obtain the primary party’s 
permission even if he is nearby, as long as the police do not 
remove the potentially objecting co-occupant from the entrance 
to avoid a possible objection.158 Thus, under the facts of 
Matlock, in which the defendant was in a nearby squad car, or 
under the facts of Rodriguez, in which the defendant was 
asleep in the apartment, the Randolph holding would still 
deem the searches in both cases reasonable.159  
D. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence  
Although Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer both joined 
the majority’s judgment, each wrote his own concurring 
opinion.160 Justice Breyer’s opinion set forth the idea that there 
should be no “bright-line rules” to determine whether 
  
which is preferable to conducting a warrantless search. Id. at 116-17 (citing United 
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965)).  
 154 Id. at 116 n.6 (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001)). 
Examples of such exigencies include preventing the objecting tenant from destroying 
evidence while police get warrant, or to provide protection in domestic violence 
situations. See id. 
 155 Id. at 120.  
 156 See id. at 121-22.  
 157 Id. at 121 (“[I]f a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in 
fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable 
search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take party in the 
threshold colloquy, loses out.”). Cf. Abrams, supra note 15, at 968-69 (arguing that 
Matlock’s “final formulation” does not mention a nonconsenting party’s absence, and 
thus the defendant’s location does not limit the third-party consent exception).  
 158 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120-23. 
 159 Id. at 121. See supra Part III.A-B. 
 160 Justice Stevens’s concurrence focused on the principle that neither spouse 
has the power to override the other’s constitutional right to deny entry to their castle. 
Id. at 123-25 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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warrantless searches are valid.161 Instead, he argued that the 
Court must examine the “totality of the circumstances” in order 
to decide whether the search is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.162 A situation in which a possible domestic abuse 
victim invites a police officer into the home or consents to the 
officer’s entry would be a circumstance in which one co-
occupant’s consent would be reasonable in the face of another’s 
objection.163 Justice Breyer concluded that in this case, the 
totality of circumstances did not justify the search.164  
E. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent 
Each of the three dissenters in Randolph wrote a 
separate opinion.165 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice 
Scalia, wrote his first dissenting opinion since joining the 
Supreme Court. Roberts criticized the majority for providing a 
“case-specific” holding instead of a rule that would provide 
practical guidance for the police in the field and for the lower 
courts.166 Accordingly, his dissent also contrasted with Justice 
Breyer’s “totality of circumstances” approach.167  
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of the assumption of risk principles applied in 
Matlock, arguing that a defendant’s protection of privacy 
  
 161 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 121 
(majority opinion) (stating that “we have to admit that we are drawing a fine line” by 
finding a search unreasonable as to the potential defendant who is at the door and 
objects, but not unreasonable as to “the potential objector nearby but not invited to 
take part in the threshold colloquy”).  
 162 Id. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not 
insist upon bright-line rules. Rather, it recognizes that no single set of legal rules can 
capture the ever changing complexity of human life.”). 
 163  Id. at 127. 
 164 Id.  
 165 Justice Scalia’s separate dissenting opinion was a direct response to 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence. See supra note 160; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 142-45 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that, although Justice Stevens seemed to be concerned 
about the relative rights of women to their husbands, the “effect of [the] decision . . . is 
to give men the power to stop women from allowing police into their homes—which 
is . . . precisely the power that Justice Stevens disapprovingly presumes men had in 
1791”). Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that when Janet Randolph led the police 
officer into the house and showed him the evidence of drug use, this was not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 145-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (holding that when a citizen led police into 
a house to show them evidence relevant to the investigation of a crime, the citizen was 
not acting as an agent of the police, and no Fourth Amendment search had occurred). 
 166 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 142 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing id. at 126-27 
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 167 Id. at 126-27 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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cannot depend upon whether or not he is present at the door at 
the time of the search, as the majority maintains.168 The Chief 
Justice argued that a third party’s consent is valid even when 
the primary party is present and objects because the police 
would only be searching common areas over which both 
residents have authority.169 If a person does not want to assume 
the risk that a co-occupant might consent to a police search, he 
can place his belongings “in an area over which others do not 
share access and control.”170 This search was also justified, 
Roberts argued, on grounds that the majority’s rule would 
hinder the police from entering houses where domestic violence 
is occurring.171 This is because, under the majority rule, the 
police cannot enter a home to assist with the dispute if the 
abuser objects to the police’s entry.172 
VI.  POST-RANDOLPH ANALYSIS  
According to a Northern District of California court, 
“Randolph does not represent a great change in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.”173 Since Randolph, very few state 
or federal courts have used its holding to rule that third-party 
consent searches are unreasonable where the primary party is 
physically present at the time of the search. There are two 
reasons why this is so. First, the fact-specific and narrow 
holding of Randolph marginalizes its importance as a Fourth 
Amendment case.174 Second, even if Randolph does apply 
factually, public policy arguments may weigh in favor of state 
and federal courts adhering to the pre-Randolph majority view 
that these types of warrantless searches are reasonable. A 
solution to this problem is to modify the definitions of 
“physically present” and “express refusal” so that they can be 
interpreted more uniformly while also compromising between 
conflicting policy considerations.  
  
 168 Id. at 134-35, 134 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 169 Id. at 133-36. 
 170 Id. at 135.  
 171 Id. at 139.  
 172  Id.  
 173 United States v. McGregor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *15 n.4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 17, 2006).  
 174 David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: 
The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 293 
(2006).  
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A. Randolph’s Narrow Holding and Lack of  
Factual Applicability  
Since the Supreme Court’s decision, many state and 
federal courts have distinguished their cases factually from 
Randolph, finding it to be inapplicable.175 These courts have 
interpreted the decision quite narrowly, as if it has “almost no 
precedential value.”176 In theory, of course, Randolph 
represents a marked change and provides a new restriction to 
the third-party consent exception to Fourth Amendment search 
and seizures.177 In practice, however, the Randolph holding 
applies only in factually limited situations in which three 
distinct events must occur: (1) a third party must properly give 
consent to the search; (2) the defendant must be physically 
present at the time of the search; and (3) the defendant must 
expressly refuse to give consent to the search. While the first 
event is not much of an issue because Randolph does not 
change the third party’s authority to consent, the other two 
events can only occur in limited circumstances. As a result, 
these lower courts are finding that, despite the Supreme 
Court’s response to this issue, Randolph simply does not apply 
in many third-party consent cases. Courts consistently 
distinguish Randolph in one of two ways: they either find that 
the defendant did not expressly object to the search, or that the 
defendant was not physically present at the time of the search.  
1.  Express Refusal Distinctions 
One group of courts has distinguished Randolph on the 
grounds that the defendant did not expressly object or refuse to 
consent to the search. These courts have held that a 
warrantless search conducted with the consent of a third party 
is valid. The Supreme Court in Randolph did not elaborate on 
the extent of the refusal of consent necessary other than to 
state that it must be expressly given.178 In United States v. 
  
 175 See infra Part VI.A.1-2. 
 176 Moran, supra note 174, at 284-85. But see, e.g., United States v. Groves, 
470 F.3d 311, 318-20 (7th Cir. 2006) (using Randolph as current precedent to address 
the issues within the third-party consent doctrine).  
 177 See supra Parts III and IV.  
 178 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120 (“We therefore hold that a warrantless search of 
a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically 
present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent 
given to the police by another resident.”). 
2007] YOU SAY YES, BUT CAN I SAY NO? 445 
McKerrell, the Tenth Circuit strictly interpreted this to mean 
that implied refusal by a physically present primary party is 
insufficient to trump a third party’s consent.179 In United States 
v. Murphy, the Kansas District Court found that it did not have 
to analyze the case under Randolph because the defendant 
waived his reliance on this case.180 The court stated in dicta, 
however, that if it were to analyze the case under Randolph, it 
would find that the Supreme Court case was distinguishable 
because there was not an unequivocal refusal of consent by the 
defendant.181 In Murphy, when the agent entered the home, the 
defendant stated, “You cannot go in there. It’s not my home, 
but none gave you permission. It belongs to my mother.”182 The 
court stated that this would not be a personal objection.183 In 
United States v. Reed, the Northern District of Indiana also 
differentiated between objecting to consent and declining to 
consent.184 For example, when asked for consent to search his 
house, the defendant in Reed told the police, “[T]hat’s not my 
place, I can’t give you permission for that.”185 The court found 
that the defendant did not expressly refuse to consent in the 
manner that Randolph requires.186  
Similarly, in United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, the 
Middle District of Florida held that “consent with qualification” 
is not a refusal to consent.187 There, the defendant was arrested, 
  
 179 United States v. McKerrel, 491 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 180 United States v. Murphy, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192 (D. Kan. 2006). The 
Randolph decision came down after this case was briefed, but before the evidentiary 
hearing. The defendant chose not to rely on this case because he believed he had no 
right to relief under Randolph. Instead of arguing the lack of valid third-party consent, 
he contended that no one consented to the search at all. Id. at 1189 n.4. 
 181 Id. at 1193.  
 182 Id. at 1192. 
 183 Id. at 1193.  
 184 United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75, 2006 WL 2252515, at *5 (N.D. Ind. 
Aug. 3, 2006) (holding that a search was reasonable where the defendant’s co-occupant 
gave consent while the defendant was in police custody and had earlier declined the 
police officer’s request for his consent).  
 185 Id. The fact that the police believed and later confirmed that it was in fact 
the defendant’s premises did not change the court’s ruling that the defendant’s 
response was not an objection. Id. at *5. 
 186 Id. at *4-5.  
 187 United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-CR-6-OC-10, 2006 WL 
1704461, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2006); see LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 8, § 8.1 
(explaining that a consent may be expressly or implicitly limited by terms such as time, 
duration, area, or intensity, and police officers must take these limitations into 
account); see also Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § SS 240.3 (1975) 
(providing that a consent search “shall not exceed, in duration or physical scope, the 
limits of the consent given”); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“Nothing in Schneckloth suggests . . . that a consent which waives Fourth Amendment 
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and he told agents during an interview that they could search 
his residence but not until the morning because he did not 
want them to disturb his sickly wife.188 The agents 
subsequently went to the defendant’s house and asked the 
defendant’s wife for permission to search the house then or, if 
she would prefer, they would come back in the morning. She 
told the police that it was fine for them to search then.189 The 
defendant relied on Randolph to argue that by telling the 
agents to wait until the morning he had made a refusal.190 The 
court disagreed, ruling that this was merely “a time frame on 
the consent” and not a refusal to consent.191 The Dominguez-
Ramirez court noted, however, that even if the defendant’s 
refusal to consent to the search were valid, his absence from 
the premises at the time of the refusal distinguishes the case.192  
In sum, lower courts have been very strict about what 
they consider “express refusal” in these situations. As a result, 
Randolph is typically distinguished and third-party consent 
searches—even where the primary party is present—have 
seldom been found unreasonable.  
2.  Physically Present Distinctions 
Another group of cases has distinguished Randolph on 
the grounds that the defendant was not present at the time a 
third party gave consent. This is a result of the Supreme Court 
majority’s unwillingness to undermine the Matlock rule to the 
extent that a person who is nearby but not actually part of the 
conversation with the police officers is not physically present, 
but is instead an “absent, nonconsenting person.”193 While 
determination of consent is based on an objective standard,194 
  
rights cannot be limited, qualified, or withdrawn”); United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 
739, 744 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding that limitations placed on consent were valid, but 
holding that the officers acted within those limitations); United States v. Miller, 491 
F.2d 638, 650 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that any limitations on the consent given were 
withdrawn by the defendant’s later actions); United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 
(7th Cir. 1971) (stating that consent searches are reasonable only if they kept within 
the bounds of the consent given).  
 188 Dominguez-Ramirez, 2006 WL 1704461, at *2.  
 189 Id. at *2-3.  
 190 Id. at *9. 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. (stressing that Randolph had “left intact the rule that the consent of 
only one co-tenant is sufficient so long as the objector is not present”).  
 193 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121-22 (2006); see United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).  
 194 See supra Part II.B. 
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the determination of “physically present” or “nearby but not 
part of the colloquy” is not.195 Randolph did not define these 
terms other than to say that one making an objection at the 
door would be considered physical present.196 Yet the door 
cannot be the only valid place to object, since a colloquy 
regarding consent can easily take place elsewhere, such as the 
front yard or backyard. Thus, despite the Court’s bright-line 
rule, there is still room for interpretation over what is close 
enough to be “at the door,” and what is required to be “part of 
the colloquy.” Without further guidance, it is utterly subjective 
whether a suspect is sufficiently close to the door to be entitled 
to participate in the colloquy regarding consent. The police and, 
ultimately, the prosecutor might perceive the defendant to be 
at a far enough distance so as to be considered merely “nearby” 
at best. The defendant, in contrast, could perceive his distance 
at the time he objects to be close enough to be considered part 
of the colloquy.  
In United States v. Reed, the Northern District of 
Indiana found that Randolph was distinguishable on the 
ground that the defendant was not physically present at the 
time of the search, even though the police knew he declined 
consent earlier.197 Because Randolph did not discuss other 
types of withheld consent, such as where the primary party 
makes his objection to a search before the police arrive at the 
home, the Court found no reason to apply the Randolph 
holding.198 The court argued that Randolph does not require the 
police to obtain affirmative consent from all known occupants 
of a residence.199 In United States v. Davis, the defendant was 
asleep in the house and did not object when the police knocked 
on the door and shouted into the house; therefore, the court 
found Randolph inapplicable because he was not physically 
present at the door.200 In Davis, the court did not have to 
  
 195  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  
 196 The closest the Court comes to explaining how these terms should be 
defined is the majority’s distinction between the facts of Randolph and those of Matlock 
and Rodriguez. See Randolph, 126 U.S. at 121.  
 197 United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75, 2006 WL 2252515, at *4-6 (N.D. 
Ind. Aug. 3, 2006). 
 198 Id. at *5. 
 199 Id. at *6.  
 200 United States v. Davis, No. 1:06-CR-69, 2006 WL 2644987, at *2 (W.D. 
Mich. Sept. 14, 2006); see also United States v. Crosbie, 2006 WL 1663667 at *1-2 (S.D. 
Ala. June 9, 2006) (declining to extend Randolph’s “narrow holding” where defendant 
claimed he did not have an opportunity to object after his wife ordered him out of the 
home, and a subsequent search was conducted pursuant to the wife’s consent); Starks 
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factually distinguish Randolph because the Supreme Court 
specifically stated that a potentially objecting co-occupant does 
not override the consent of a third party if the objecting co-
occupant is nearby but not at the door and objecting.201  
Thus, in addition to their strict construal of “express 
refusal,” lower courts interpret Randolph’s definition of 
“physically present” very narrowly as well. This is not 
surprising, however, because under Randolph a third-party 
consent search could be reasonable even where the primary 
party is not very far from the search.  
3.  The Randolph Precedent Still Results in Some  
Invalidation of Searches  
Not all courts, however, have refused to find a third-
party consent search unreasonable under Randolph. In United 
States v. Hudspeth, the Eighth Circuit originally held that a 
third party’s consent was invalid where the defendant 
expressly objected to consent even though he was not present 
at the time of the search.202 This would have expanded the 
Randolph holding and would have been contrary to Reed,203 but 
the court vacated its opinion after a rehearing en banc. In 
Hudspeth, the police asked the defendant for consent to search 
his home computer, which he refused to give.204 Subsequently, 
he was arrested and taken to jail while the police went to the 
defendant’s home and obtained consent to search from his 
wife.205 Distinguishing the hypothetical situation discussed in 
Randolph, in which a “potential objector” is not asked for his 
consent,206 the court held that, because “[the defendant] was 
invited to participate and expressly denied his consent to 
search,”207 there was a disputed invitation that made the search 
  
v. State, 846 N.E.2d 673, 677-78, 682 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (distinguishing Randolph 
on the basis that, where police were informed the suspect was in the house and police 
subsequently entered the house to find the suspect, the defendant was not physically 
present at the time a third party consented).  
 201 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  
 202 United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16854 (8th Cir. Jan. 4, 2007).  
 203 United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75, 2006 WL 2252515, at *10 (N.D. Ind. 
Aug. 3, 2006). 
 204 Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 925. 
 205 Id.  
 206 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121-22.  
 207 Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 931 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121).  
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unreasonable.208 A dissenting opinion argued that Randolph 
should not apply because the defendant was not physically 
present, and that to hold otherwise would mean that Randolph 
overruled Matlock, which it expressly did not do.209  
Relying on the original Hudspeth opinion (before it was 
vacated), the Northern District of Illinois in United States v. 
Henderson suppressed evidence that was the fruit of a third-
party consent search.210 In Henderson, after the police entered 
the defendant’s house, the defendant told them to get out, but 
the police obtained consent to search the house from the 
defendant’s wife.211 Under Randolph, because the defendant 
was physically present when he objected to the search, a search 
based on the subsequent third-party consent was 
unreasonable.212 A Texas Court of Appeals, in Odom v. Texas, 
also held that a third party’s prior consent was invalid when 
the appellant, a guest at the third party’s home, was present at 
the time of the search and expressly objected to it.213  
B.  Public Policy Implications  
Although courts distinguish Randolph on an objective, 
factual basis, there are also subjective, public policy reasons 
that make the Randolph holding undesirable. The public policy 
implications of the Randolph rule include, ironically, the risk of 
infringing a defendant’s constitutional rights as well as the risk 
posed to domestic violence victims. Because there was such a 
clear majority view among the courts before Randolph, it is not 
surprising that various public policy considerations support the 
pre-Randolph majority position, which deemed a search 
reasonable and valid when a third party consents while a 
physically present primary party refuses consent. 
Nevertheless, other public policy arguments favor adopting 
what had been the minority view, as Randolph did, that such 
searches should be deemed unreasonable and therefore invalid.  
  
 208 Id. (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113).  
 209 Id. at 933 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 210 United States v. Henderson, 2006 WL 3469538, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  
 211 Id. at *1. 
 212 Id. at *2. 
 213 Odom v. Texas, 200 S.W.3d 333, 335-37 (Tex. App. 2006). 
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1.  Infringing a Physically Present Defendant’s Rights 
Due to Law Enforcement Objectives 
Although, ideally, Randolph should serve to benefit 
suspects, in reality a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights are 
more likely to be infringed in these types of third-party consent 
situations. As the Randolph majority acknowledges, it may be 
too difficult or impractical for the police to obtain consent from 
a suspect in the vicinity of the premises being searched.214 The 
Court insisted that the police do not have to take affirmative 
steps to find a potentially objecting co-occupant if they already 
have the consent of another co-occupant, as long as the police 
do not deliberately remove the potential objector from the scene 
to avoid an objection.215 Yet the police are not prohibited from 
avoiding an objection by excluding the potential objector from 
the dialogue in which the police seek consent. With respect to 
what is considered an objecting co-occupant, the Court drew 
the line at a co-occupant who is nearby but not part of the 
colloquy with the police regarding consent.216 The co-occupant 
who talks to one police officer on the driveway while his co-
occupant gives consent to another police officer at the door is 
not physically present, and a search would be reasonable as to 
him. Thus, despite the “bright-line” rule,217 law enforcement 
agents still have the flexibility not to engage the suspect in a 
conversation in order to avoid an objection to a third party’s 
consent. As a result, defendants in these situations could easily 
be precluded from the opportunity to object to a search, which 
would interfere with their expectation of privacy and Fourth 
Amendment rights if the fruits of that search were admitted as 
evidence against them at trial.  
Articulating this point, the dissent in Hudspeth stated 
that finding these types of searches unreasonable will 
encourage the police to avoid obtaining the defendant’s 
consent.218 By not asking a primary party for his consent, the 
police will avoid the problem of his potential objection and thus 
render the search reasonable under Matlock if they obtain 
  
 214 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006). 
 215 Id.  
 216 Id. at 121. 
 217 Id. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 218 United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2006) (Riley, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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consent from a co-occupant.219 Worried about this “troubling 
situation,” one commentator lamented that “police could 
circumvent the ‘ask the present primary party’ rule simply by 
taking the primary party into custody and removing him from 
the scene, as they did in Matlock.”220 In United States v. 
DiModica, this situation confronted the Seventh Circuit.221 The 
defendant’s wife called the police to report domestic abuse and 
gave permission to search her home.222 When the police arrived 
at the house, they arrested the defendant based on probable 
cause of abuse.223 The defendant’s wife was not present at the 
time of the search.224 The defendant analogized the facts of this 
case to Randolph and argued that the police arrested him to 
avoid his potential objection to the search.225 Nevertheless, the 
court easily distinguished Randolph because here the police 
never asked the defendant for his consent as they had in 
Randolph, nor did the defendant voluntarily express his 
objection to a search.226 DiModica, however, is an example of a 
court relying on the subjectivity of the police’s judgment. 
Because they already had the consent of a third party through 
the defendant’s wife, the police decided to arrest the suspect 
instead of attempting to obtain his consent to search.227 
Alternatively, the police could have attempted to obtain a 
search warrant before arriving at the suspect’s home. 
Nevertheless, the court in DiModica ratified the police’s 
decision to arrest the defendant by rejecting his Randolph 
argument that the police deliberately avoided his potential 
objection; thus the court found that the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated even though he was 
present.228  
  
 219 Id.  
 220 Wright, supra note 40, at 1871 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 170 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).  
 221 United States v. DiModica, 468 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 222 Id. at 496-97. 
 223 Id. at 497.  
 224 Id.  
 225 Id. at 500. The majority in Randolph expressly noted that the police cannot 
remove a potentially objecting co-occupant for the sake of avoiding a possible objection. 
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).  
 226 DiModica, 468 F.3d at 500.   
 227 Because the defendant’s wife was not home with the defendant at the time, 
she was not at risk of further harm, unlike other situations of domestic violence.  
 228 DiModica, 468 F.3d at 500. 
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2.  Protecting Defendants’ Rights at the Expense of 
Possible Domestic Violence Victims 
A second public policy reason that may make the 
Randolph decision unappealing to lower courts is the fear that 
domestic violence victims will not be protected because of the 
new constitutional protections given to the defendant.229 There 
is a concern about protecting a domestic violence victim in a 
situation where the victim calls the police but the alleged 
abuser does not allow the police to enter and stop the abuse.230 
Although Randolph recognizes domestic violence as an 
exigency that may justify a warrantless search despite a 
primary party’s objection over a third party’s consent,231 the 
new doctrine could cause the police to hesitate before entering 
or searching a house when it is not clear that domestic violence 
is occurring.  
When it is not clear that domestic violence is taking 
place, it will not be clear whether exigent circumstances are 
present. In Randolph, Chief Justice Roberts found the 
majority’s reliance on exigent circumstances insufficient to 
justify an entry during a domestic dispute.232 Scholars have 
different views about the efficacy of the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement under circumstances 
indicating domestic violence. One Fourth Amendment scholar, 
Wayne LaFave, supports the proposition that “ ‘where the 
defendant has victimized the third party . . . the emergency 
nature of the situation is such that the third-party consent 
should validate a warrantless search despite defendant’s 
objections.’”233 Other commentators complain that a court’s 
decision on third-party consent searches where there is 
disputed permission will depend on the court’s degree of 
understanding of domestic violence.234 Roberts argued that it 
  
 229 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 139-42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 230 Id.  
 231 Id. at 118-19 (majority opinion) (stating that certain exigencies may justify 
immediate action by the police).  
 232 Id. at 139-40 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s rule 
would prohibit the police from entering to assist during a domestic dispute if the 
potential abuser who had prompted police involvement objected to the entry).  
 233 LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 161, § 8.3(d) (quoting Comment, 41 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 121, 136 n.88 (1973)); see also United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1979); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 
1311 (Colo. 1995). But see Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977). 
 234 E.g., Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 
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would be better to “give effect to a consenting spouse’s 
authority to permit entry into her house to avoid such 
situations.”235 However, the difference between justifying the 
search upon a domestic violence exigency and effectively 
allowing the victimized spouse’s consent to override the other 
spouse’s objection may prove to be insignificant in practice.236 
One way or another, the police will find a way to protect 
victims of domestic violence in these situations. Although 
courts and the government should be wary of how it plays out, 
it is unlikely that the result of Randolph will have much of an 
effect on this issue.  
3.  Arguments Supporting Randolph: Preserving  
Peace and Possessory Interests  
Despite arguments against the adherence to Randolph, 
there are also public policy considerations that support the 
Randolph holding. One policy is the preservation of possessory 
interests in the property.237 The Randolph majority based much 
of its reasoning on the theory that no one occupant should have 
a superior property right over the other.238 The Court in 
Randolph also opined that it is not reasonable to recognize a 
greater expectation of privacy for overnight houseguests than 
for the co-occupant of a home.239 With these ideas in mind, 
consider this hypothetical situation: Michael and Jennifer are 
husband and wife and share a house together. Their friend 
  
1156 (1993) (arguing that in Commonwealth v. Rexach, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 919 (1985), 
the court “demonstrated an in depth understanding of the dynamics of domestic 
violence” as it held that a warrantless search was valid on the wife’s consent because 
“following the defendant into the bedroom” despite his objections “was justified by the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement”). 
 235 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 140.  
 236 Because Randolph still allows the police to enter over a resident’s objection 
in the case of an emergency situation, Randolph does not have much of a practical 
impact. Moran, supra note 174, at 292; see also Stephen Henderson, Justices Limit 
Home Searches, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 23, 2006, at A01 (quoting a Burlington 
County prosecutor, “I don’t think this [decision] will hamper police. . . . [They] 
presently have the authority to enter when there is evidence of domestic violence 
occurring or having occurred.”); Charles Lane, High Court Restricts Right of Officers to 
Enter Homes, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., March 23, 2006, at A1 (quoting a chief criminal 
deputy, “[A]s far as this Sheriff’s Office is concerned, our duty to protect life in an 
emergency will always win out over the possible suppression of evidence.”). 
 237 Abrams, supra note 15, at 973.  
 238 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114 (majority opinion); see also LAFAVE, supra note 
37, at 160, § 8.3(d) (explaining that there are no superior property rights only where 
occupants have equal use of place, and that this principle does not apply to children).  
 239 See supra Part V.  
454 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
Thomas, their houseguest, is sleeping on the living room sofa 
for the night. The police knock on the door, and Michael, 
Jennifer, and Thomas all answer the door. The police do not 
have a warrant, but they ask all three occupants whether they 
can enter and search the living room. Thomas, the houseguest, 
refuses to give consent. Michael also refuses. Jennifer, 
however, does give consent. The Court suggested that if it did 
not rule the way it did, then this search could be valid as to 
Michael, a resident of the house, but not valid as to Thomas, 
the houseguest.240 The absurdity of recognizing a greater 
expectation of privacy for a houseguest than for a co-occupant 
undermines the protection of privacy rationale behind the 
Fourth Amendment.  
Another policy reason in favor of Randolph is that it 
promotes peace and tranquility among joint occupants.241 By 
invalidating searches in which there is a dispute between the 
two occupants over whether to allow the police to enter, the 
Court created a rule that minimizes interference in such 
private disputes. There will be less chance of increasing the 
flare-up between the two occupants by respecting the wishes of 
the objector rather than the consenter. An objector may be 
furious at a consenter for allowing the police to invade the 
privacy of his home, whereas the consenter would typically be 
only frustrated at most. Even so, the consenter is not hindered 
from providing the police with evidence or information to assist 
them in obtaining a search warrant.242 The Randolph holding 
protects the sanctity of the home and continues to demonstrate 
that our society favors searches pursuant to a warrant.243 It is 
important to remember that the presumption is that 
warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.244 Thus, there are strong reasons to support and 
adhere to the holding of Randolph.  
  
 240 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113 (explaining that if that our society gives a 
legitimate expectation of privacy to an overnight houseguest, “it presumably should 
follow that an inhabitant of shared premises may claim at least as much, and it turns 
out that the co-inhabitant naturally has an even stronger claim”). 
 241 Abrams, supra note 15, at 973. 
 242 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-89 (1971).  
 243 Timothy H. Everett, Developments in Connecticut Criminal Law: 2005, 80 
CONN. B.J. 185, 189 (2006).  
 244 See supra Part II.  
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C.  Modifying Randolph by Defining “Physically Present” 
and “Express Refusal” 
The fact that many federal and state courts have 
distinguished Randolph within a year after it was decided 
indicates that there is a problem with its holding. Either 
Randolph is objectively narrow and only applies in certain 
factual situations, or the lower courts are subjectively reluctant 
to apply Randolph because of public policy reasons. Instead of 
providing uniformity on the issue, Randolph’s case-by-case 
formula maintains the split in authority that existed before the 
case was decided.245 There are two main issues on which lower 
courts distinguish the Supreme Court’s decision: (1) what is an 
express refusal of consent and (2) what is the meaning of being 
“physically present” in a warrantless search scenario?246 The 
Supreme Court did not fully clarify either of these terms in its 
holding, which gives lower courts flexibility in defining them. 
As some courts uphold these types of warrantless searches 
while other courts invalidate them, our constitutional law is 
inconsistent. The Court should address both questions to 
ensure uniformity. By interpreting “physically present” broadly 
and “express refusal” narrowly, it will promote consistency 
among future court rulings. 
1. “Physically Present” Primary Parties 
a. Physical Presence Should Be Defined Broadly  
The physical presence of a primary party at the time the 
police seek, obtain, or apply a third party’s consent is a crucial 
factor in protecting the primary party’s personal autonomy. 
Requiring the consent of both present co-occupants strikes the 
appropriate balance between preserving individual liberties 
and permitting police expediency.247 This approach reaffirms 
that Matlock third-party consent searches are only valid 
against “absent, nonconsenting persons.”248 Such an 
interpretation incorporates the Randolph doctrine to the extent 
  
 245 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 142 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 246 See supra Part VI.A.  
 247 State v. Brunetti, 883 A.2d 1167, 1181 (Conn. 2005) (reasoning that while 
an assumption-of-risk analysis is reasonable when applied against an absent co-
occupant, applying it against a present objecting co-occupant would render as inferior 
that co-occupant’s constitutional rights, given the “manifest preference for warrants”). 
 248 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). See supra Part III.A. 
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that third-party consent searches are invalid with respect to a 
present and objecting primary party.249 Simultaneously, this 
definition requires a significant deviation from the Randolph 
holding, which validates searches where the same person is 
“nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold 
colloquy.”250  
Although much of the pre-Randolph commentary and 
many cases did not interpret Matlock this way, Randolph 
surprisingly made it clear that physically present primary 
parties are protected under the Fourth Amendment. However, 
Randolph limited the significance of this holding by not 
extending this protection to potentially objecting parties who 
are merely nearby.251 The Randolph majority went too far to 
preserve the holding of Matlock by allowing the police to bypass 
nearby suspects without asking for their consent. Expanding 
the term “physically present” in this context would not 
undercut Matlock, as the Randolph court feared it might,252 
because searches are still valid against absent, nonconsenting 
co-occupants. For example, although the Court interpreted 
Matlock as drawing a distinction between a present and an 
absent primary party, it declared that the defendant in Matlock 
who was in a squad car near the house during the search was 
absent. That reasoning blurs the line between a primary party 
who is absent and one who is present.  
The significance of deeming searches unreasonable as to 
a physically present co-occupant who expressly refuses consent 
is meaningless unless the definition of physical presence gives 
that co-occupant an opportunity to express his refusal. Nearly 
all defendants will be considered absent if the definition of 
physical presence does not include those who are “nearby but 
not part of the colloquy.”253 Yet the Court did not define 
“nearby” and only recognized objections made at the door.254 As 
a result, the government can bypass the consent requirement 
by instructing the police to only ask for consent when the 
suspect is in very close proximity to the scene and to avoid or 
  
 249 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.  
 250 Id. at 121.  
 251 Id.  
 252 Id.  
 253  Id.; see supra Parts V.C, VI.A.2. 
 254  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121. 
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ignore him when he is a short distance away.255 Physical 
presence should be defined broadly so as not to exclude a 
nearby defendant from Fourth Amendment protection and to 
respect his possessory interests when he is close enough to 
object to the search. This would bolster the Fourth Amendment 
protection that has been eroded by recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.256  
One possible definition for this term is to deem an 
occupant to be physically present if he is visible to the police or 
if the police know that he is on or near the premises (for 
example, sleeping or in the yard). This is a subjective approach, 
and the test would be whether the police officer actually knows 
or should know where the primary party is at the time of the 
search. The Randolph majority was concerned that requiring 
the police to take affirmative steps would be impractical or too 
complicated.257 However, for their own protection, it does not 
seem too onerous a burden for the police to at least attempt to 
learn the location of their suspect before attempting to enter 
his residence. This approach would prevent law enforcement 
agents from purposely remaining ignorant of a suspect’s 
location as a way of circumventing the requirement of asking 
for his permission. Even where the police knock on the door 
and a co-occupant third party answers and readily consents, 
the police are still likely to first ask where the suspect is before 
entering.258 Presumably, the officers would want to protect 
themselves from a possible attack by the suspect.  
Albeit similar, this approach is not as strict as the one 
proposed by Elizabeth Wright, where the police must make a 
reasonable attempt to obtain the consent of the primary party 
regardless of the primary party’s location.259 The key difference 
here is that the police need only seek a primary party’s consent 
if he is visible to the police or if the police know or should know 
that he is physically present on the premises. Wright’s 
  
 255 See supra Part VI.B.1. Alternatively, the police could find that exigencies 
were present that justified removing him from the scene by arresting him, or that 
justified conducting an immediate search of the premises without his consent. See 
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118-19 (stating that certain exigencies may justify immediate 
action by the police). Whether the police would contrive such exigencies is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  
 256 See Kloster, supra note 27, at 104-15.  
 257 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121-22. 
 258 John C. Klotter & Jacqueline R. Kanovitz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR 
POLICE 214 (3d ed. 1977) (“It is quite common for the officer to arrive at the residence 
of the suspect and find that the suspect is not home.”).  
 259 Wright, supra note 40, at 1873-76. 
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approach goes too far by requiring that the police “take 
reasonable steps to obtain consent from the party at whom the 
search is directed, whether or not that party is present at the 
scene.”260 The intermediate approach better balances the 
conflicting policy interests. 
b. A Physically Present Primary Party Must  
Have an Opportunity to Refuse  
Once the primary party is considered physically present, 
he should be given an opportunity to express his objection to 
the search. This would require the police to at least indicate to 
the primary party that they will be conducting a search, but 
not necessarily to ask him for permission. This prevents the 
problem discussed earlier where the police purposely remove 
the potential objector from the conversation with his co-
occupant regarding consent.261 Instead of automatically “losing 
out,” as Randolph suggests, he should be invited to take part in 
the colloquy. If the primary party is considered to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which would invoke Fourth 
Amendment rights, and if he is physically present at the time 
of the search, then the police should make an effort to invite 
either consent or a refusal to the search.  
For example, consider a situation in which the primary 
party is restrained by the police in the front yard about fifteen 
feet from the front door and does not know that the police are 
obtaining consent to conduct a search from his co-occupant. In 
that situation, the primary party does not have the opportunity 
to express his refusal to the search because he may not know 
such a search is about to occur.262 If the police are successful in 
obtaining consent from the third party, they should notify the 
primary party that they are about to conduct a search. If the 
primary party knows that the police are obtaining his co-
occupant’s consent to conduct a search and the primary party 
expresses his refusal from the yard, that refusal must be 
  
 260 Wright, supra note 40, at 1874-75.  
 261 See supra Part VI.B.1. 
 262 See Note, supra note 22, at 2203 (arguing that “courts stand unanimous in 
finding consent invalid when individuals are not fully aware that consent was being 
sought”). But c.f. Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318-21 (Del. 2006) (finding that a 
defendant who had an opportunity to object to a search after answering the door to 
probation officers did not express any objection when the officers began the search).  
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respected even though he is “nearby but not [taking] part in the 
threshold colloquy.”263  
A case in which this approach could have been applied 
was Starks v. State, from the Indiana Court of Appeals, in 
which the police were informed that the suspect, Starks, was in 
the basement of the house prior to entering the residence.264 
Knowing that Starks was armed, the police entered and placed 
him in handcuffs.265 The police then conducted a search based 
upon a third party’s consent without first discussing it with 
Starks, who was clearly present and not about to go 
anywhere.266 The court held that, under Primus v. State,267 it 
was unnecessary for the police to ask for his consent when they 
already had the permission of a third party.268 While Randolph 
discounted the idea of requiring the police to take affirmative 
steps to find a potentially objecting co-occupant, this approach 
would only require affirmative steps to be taken when the co-
occupant had already been found. The issues involved with 
locating the co-occupant, such as time consumption, 
impracticalities, and lack of clarity about whom to locate,269 are 
limited when the potentially objecting co-occupant is within 
feet of the police and when it would take seconds, or minutes at 
most, to indicate that they will be conducting a search.  
The Randolph majority feared that “every cotenant case 
would turn into a test about the adequacy of the police’s efforts 
to consult with a potential objector.”270 The Court reasoned 
that, since most suspects actually give their consent when 
asked for it,271 the police should not be required to ask the 
primary party for his consent. Yet for this precise reason, 
assuming that supposition is true, requiring the police to tell a 
physically present suspect of an impending search would not 
interfere with the goals of law enforcement. If the primary 
party is likely to give consent and actually does so, no third-
party consent is needed at all. If the primary party does not 
consent but is at least informed of the impending search and 
  
 263 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  
 264 Starks v. State, 846 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 265 Id. at 677-78. 
 266 Id. at 678.  
 267 813 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 268 Starks, 846 N.E.2d at 681-82, 682 n.1 (distinguishing Randolph in that 
Starks was not physically present or did not expressly refuse to consent to the search).  
 269 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121-22.  
 270 Id. at 122.  
 271 Id. 
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does not object, the prosecutor has a stronger argument that 
the search was reasonable, rather than having to rely on the 
adequacy of the third-party consent alone. By adopting this 
approach, law enforcement agents do risk receiving an express 
refusal to a search request, but in the more common scenario 
where the primary party consents or acquiesces, the facts 
would likely support a finding that the search was reasonable 
under Randolph.  
This approach can be illustrated through the example of 
when the primary party is asleep. If the police know that the 
primary party is asleep while the police obtain a third party’s 
consent, an attempt to wake him should be made either by the 
police or his co-occupant. The Randolph majority considered 
this scenario, but rejected it so as not to undercut Rodriguez 
and also to draw the “fine line” for reasonableness of these 
searches when the defendant is at the door and objecting.272 
This result, however, is too harsh for the primary party. In 
United States v. Davis, for example, the defendant, who was 
asleep in his house, was considered “absent” because he did not 
come to the door after the police knocked and shouted before 
entering.273 Even though the defendant was presumably not too 
far from the door, this was still considered an absence under 
Randolph.274 This further illustrates that the difference 
between being considered absent or present is fundamental to 
the protection of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  
What would happen if the primary party woke up in the 
middle of the search and objected to it? Would the police stop 
the search and not use any evidence they found against him? In 
order to maintain our “widely held social expectations,”275 
someone should tell the primary party that his property is 
being searched by the police instead of having the suspect wake 
up to find the police rummaging through his belongings. Such 
actions run counter to a person’s expectation of privacy and 
thus are inconsistent with a key concept of the Fourth 
Amendment. If no one is available to wake a primary party 
before the search, the police should then obtain a warrant. 
  
 272 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) 
(holding that a search was reasonable where the defendant was asleep and the police 
did not rouse him before entering and searching the premises). See supra Part III.B.  
 273 United States v. Davis, No. 1:06-CR-69, 2006 WL 2644987, at *2 (W.D. 
Mich. Sept. 14, 2006).  
 274  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121. See supra note 196.  
 275 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.  
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Without such a requirement, the police may not bother making 
any attempt to obtain a sleeping primary party’s consent and 
instead begin the search before he awakes and has an 
opportunity to object. This would be analogous to removing the 
primary party to avoid his possible objection, which Randolph 
prohibits.276  
Therefore, the Randolph rule should be modified to 
provide a more expansive definition of “physically present” and 
to require the police to at least notify a physically present 
primary party that they will be conducting a search. This is 
necessary even though it undercuts the Matlock rule. The 
Matlock rule should apply to absent primary parties, and the 
Randolph rule should apply to present primary parties. As a 
result, there would be less confusion about which case applies 
under a given set of circumstances.  
2.  “Express Refusal” Should Be Defined Narrowly 
Once the primary party is considered physically present 
and the police have told him about the search, the primary 
party then has the opportunity to make an express refusal to 
the search. The determination of whether there is express 
refusal by the primary party should be based on the objective 
reasonableness of a police officer, as in any consent case.277 It 
should be the responsibility of the defendant to expressly object 
or make a refusal to the search when he is given the 
opportunity to do so. Under Randolph, the police cannot validly 
conduct a warrantless search where at least one present co-
occupant expressly refuses to consent to the search.278 The 
Court should continue to have a strict requirement of the term 
“express refusal” because this will strike an appropriate 
balance with a more expansive definition of physically 
present.279 While law enforcement agents should be required to 
maximize the number of co-occupants included in the consent 
colloquy, agents should not be required to refrain from 
  
 276 Id. at 121.  
 277 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; see also Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing, inter alia, Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-89 (1990)) 
(noting that the “standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the 
Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?”). 
 278 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.  
 279 See supra Part VI.C.1.  
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searching where one co-occupant expressly consents and 
another does not expressly refuse. The Court should go a step 
further, however, by defining the parameters of express 
refusal. Although Randolph did hold that the refusal must be 
unequivocal, courts have been interpreting this phrase 
differently, with some courts applying Randolph and others 
not.280 A more uniform definition of express refusal will make it 
simpler to determine if the search was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  
For example, the term “express refusal” could require 
that a primary party clearly indicate his unequivocal objection 
to the search in the negative. This does not require one 
particular way for a primary party to express refusal, as long 
as it is reasonable for an officer to understand that an objection 
was made. For example, a primary party does not need to say 
“I refuse to consent to a search” in order for an express refusal 
to be recognized. A simple “No” or “I don’t want you to search” 
should be sufficient. Thus, the police would have the simple 
task of determining whether the primary party’s statement, 
whether unsolicited or upon request, unequivocally objects to 
the search.  
There is a clear difference, however, between objecting 
to a search and declining to consent.281 Declining to consent 
should not be sufficient to create a dispute over permission to 
enter or search, and therefore it should not invalidate a third-
party consent search. For example, silence in response to a 
request for consent should not be considered an express 
refusal. Nor should any statement that the police could 
reasonably understand to be an abdication of authority over 
the premises being searched.282 If the primary party says to the 
officer “It’s not my home; you can’t go in there,” this would not 
be an express refusal because the primary party has not 
unequivocally stated his personal objection to the search.283 
  
 280 See supra Part VI.A.1.  
 281 See United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75, 2006 WL 2252515, at *5 (N.D. 
Ind. Aug. 3, 2006). 
 282 See United States v. Sandoval-Espana, 459 F. Supp. 2d 121, 136 (D.R.I. 
2006); see also United States v. Jones, 184 Fed. Appx. 943, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the validity of a search 
because he failed to show a subjective expectation of privacy where he stated that he 
had no authority to give consent to search the residence, despite having personal 
effects there).  
 283 See United States v. Murphy, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 
2006); see also Reed, 2006 WL 2252515 at *5 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113) 
(reasoning that if a visitor is at the door of a residence, his confidence about whether he 
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Similarly, if the primary party answers “It’s not mine” in 
response to a request for permission to search the vehicle he is 
operating after obtaining the consent of a co-passenger, this 
also would not be an express refusal.284 Instead of expressing 
his objection, such a statement merely indicates to the police 
that the primary party does not believe the police have 
permission. On the other hand, “consent with qualification”285 
should be respected if the primary party makes clear that he 
refuses and if it is reasonable for the police officer to 
understand the limitations on the consent.286  
There are several reasons why the standard for express 
refusal should be defined more narrowly. First, in these 
situations, there would already be third-party consent, which 
has been recognized as valid consent for years in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.287 The express refusal must be sufficiently 
clear to the police to render the permission disputed, which 
would negate the validity of the third party’s consent.288 Just as 
a warrantless consent search will only be reasonable with 
clearly expressed consent from the primary party,289 a 
warrantless third-party consent search should only be 
unreasonable if the primary party expressly refuses in the face 
of a third party’s express consent. Second, as mentioned above, 
most suspects when asked for consent are likely to give it.290 
Thus, where one co-occupant expressly gives consent, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that another co-occupant will also 
consent if given the opportunity. If the primary party objects, 
he should be required to rebut this presumption with a clear 
showing that he, unlike his co-occupant, is not the typical 
suspect who gives his consent when asked. Third, the search 
being done without the primary party’s consent is only of 
  
has permission to enter “would be unshaken if one occupant said ‘come in,’ and the 
other said, ‘this isn’t my place’ ”).  
 284 See Sandoval-Espana, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 136.  
 285 See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-CR-6-OC-10, 2006 
WL 1704461, at *2, *8 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2006). 
 286  See supra Part IV.A.1.  
 287 See supra Part III.  
 288  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113-20; see also Fisher, supra note 74, at 204-05.  
 289 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-15 (1948) (finding that 
a search violated the Fourth Amendment when the defendant merely acquiesced to an 
officer’s demand to enter); see also Note, supra note 22, at 2203 (noting that courts 
consistently find consent searches invalid where there is “some indication [that] 
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 290 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006). 
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common areas that the co-occupants share.291 Therefore, the 
primary party has already assumed the risk that his co-
occupant will expose that area to the police in his absence,292 
and he must clearly cancel that assumption when he is present.  
Thus, there should continue to be a strict requirement of 
the defendant to expressly object to a search when a third 
party has consented to it. The refusal should be sufficiently 
clear to the police such that a reasonable law enforcement 
agent would understand that the defendant disputes the 
consent offered by a co-occupant.  
VII.  CONCLUSION  
The United States Supreme Court changed the 
warrantless third-party consent search doctrine in Georgia v. 
Randolph.293 Previously, under United States v. Matlock,294 
warrantless consent searches of the common area of a home 
were deemed reasonable if a person with common authority 
over the premises consented to the search.295 A majority of 
federal and state courts had interpreted Matlock to mean that 
third-party consent searches are reasonable even if the 
defendant is physically present at the time of the search and 
objects to the search.296 A minority of state courts had 
interpreted Matlock to mean that a third party’s consent is not 
reasonable against the defendant if the defendant is present at 
the time of the search and does not consent to it. Under 
Randolph, the Supreme Court adopted the minority view by 
holding that third-party consent searches are unreasonable as 
to the defendant if the defendant is physically present and 
expressly refuses to give consent to the search.297 Despite the 
new doctrine, which in theory expands Fourth Amendment 
rights, the Randolph holding has not had a substantial impact 
on invalidating third-party consent searches as unreasonable 
in lower federal and state courts. Randolph’s narrow holding 
allows lower courts to maintain the previously existing 
majority view by distinguishing Randolph on the basis that a 
  
 291 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 133-36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 292  See supra Part III.A.  
 293 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108.  
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 295 Id. at 171.  
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defendant was either not physically present at the time of the 
search or did not expressly object to the search.298 To remedy 
this continuing lack of uniformity, the Supreme Court must 
modify the existing doctrine. The term “physically present” 
should be defined more broadly so that more suspects have the 
opportunity to object to the search, and consequently more 
defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights are protected.299 The 
term “express refusal” should be defined more narrowly so that 
when the police obtain the consent of a third party, an 
ambiguous refusal by the defendant does not prevent a search 
from being reasonable.300 As a result, lower courts will be less 
likely to distinguish Randolph when it is appropriate, and 
conflicting public policy concerns—such as permitting police 
expediency while preserving defendants’ Fourth Amendment 
rights—will be adequately balanced.  
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